Robert W. Gordon & Morton J. Horwitz, eds., Law, Society, and History: Themes in the Legal Sociology and Legal History of Lawrence M. Friedman (Cambridge Studies in Law and Society) (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2011) (From the editors' Introduction: "This book is not a Festschrift in the usual sense of a collection of miscellaneous essays by colleagues and disciplines assembled to honor a great scholar. Rather it is a sustained examination and application of the scholar's ideas ad methods. Some of the writers directly assess and comment on Friedman's vast body of work. Some examine his conclusions to see how well they have stood up over time. Others supply concepts and insights derived from Friedman's work to the study of similar problems in different periods and societies. Still other s use Friedman's concepts and insights as a foil or contrast to their own approaches to studying law and society from theoretical perspectives very different from his." Id. at 1. After reading this collection, I have no choice but to commit to rereading what I have read of Friedman's work, and reading what I have not yet read.).
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty, Volume One: Overviews and History (Emory University Studies in Law and Religion) (Grand Rapids, Michigan, & Cambridge, United Kingdom: Eerdmans, 2010) (Douglas Laycock is a legal scholar whose work and humanity I greatly admire. Those who read just this one volume of his work, agreeing or disagreeing with him, will understand why he is worthy of deep respect. From "Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching Religious Liberty and Evolutionary Changes in Casebooks" (originally published 101 Harvard Law Review 1642 (1988): "Many teachers believe that law students will not take seriously any reading other than a case or perhaps a doctrinal summary of a case. Yet that is surely the faculty's fault. If we want students to take history seriously, we must take it seriously ourselves. If we say that history is relevant to an understanding of contemporary disputes, we must visibly bring it to bear on those disputes." "Most important, we must include it in the final examination. We can assign a whole library of interdisciplinary reading, but if the examination consists of hypothetical cases requiring issue spotting and doctrinal analysis, students have every reason to study only doctrine. The grading and examination system creates an incentive structure, and we can hardly complain if students respond to it. Students are right to believe that what is important is what is the exam. But the faculty can change what is on the exam." "Forced to choose within the extraordinary constrains imposed by the case method, most of us decide that doctrine and traditional legal analysis are the most important things to teach. We may talk a different game, but our assignment sheets and our exams reveal our choices. Within the constraints of the case methods, doctrine is the right choice. I would not want to be represented by a lawyer who knows no law, however broadly educated in the liberal arts or public policy analysis. If we teach only a little bit, we should teach the core skills and information of the profession. Yet we need not be satisfied with teaching only a little bit. If we break out of the constraints imposed by the case method, our students can surely read more and learn more." Id. at 470-480.).
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty, Volume Two: The Free Exercise Clause (Grand Rapids, Michigan, & Cambridge, United Kingdom: Eerdmans, 2011) (From "Preface to Volume 2": "[T]his is the first of two volumes devoted to [Laycock's] work on protecting the free exercise of religion. This volume is devoted to constitutional protection --to the protections that are found, or should be found, in the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and in similar provisions in state constitutions. Volume 3, Religious Liberty Legislation [forthcoming], will be devoted to statutory protections for religious liberty, enacted by Congress or state legislatures in response to the narrowing or withdrawal of constitutional protection by judicial interpretation." Id. at xii.).